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The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
“SEC” or “Commission”) is nearing its seventy-fifth anniversary, a 
milestone that will be marked by reflection on the past and 
contemplation of the future.1  During this time of introspection, the 
Commission should take the opportunity to examine the manner in 
which it has reacted to the growth and changes in its regulatory authority 
and in the capital markets.  One constant throughout its history has been 
the SEC’s need to balance competing interests.  The SEC’s stated 
mission reflects this tension.  Today, that mission is composed of three 
objectives: “to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets; and facilitate capital formation.”2   
Historically, the SEC’s mission has focused on investor protection.  
As the SEC and its regulatory powers have grown in response to the 
ever more complex and international financial services markets, the 
seemingly straightforward mission of investor protection has become 
more intricate and multidimensional, prompting questions such as, 
“Who are the investors that should be protected?” and “How should they 
be protected?”  After all, investors range in sophistication, size, activity, 
goals, needs, and other attributes.  They include traditional individual 
and institutional investors in the securities markets, traders, and foreign 
entities seeking to invest in the United States.3  Choices that the SEC 
makes in its rulemaking and other activities can favor or disfavor one 
group of investors over another.  A rule beneficial for one investor may 
be detrimental to another, depending on an investor’s investment 
strategy or changing circumstances.  Indeed, because investors 
ultimately pay for inefficiencies arising from regulatory mandates 
 1. The SEC was created on July 2, 1934 during a period of heated debate over the 
country’s economic turmoil.  That day was literally heated: 93 degrees Fahrenheit, to be 
exact.  The Federal Trade Commission met in an unairconditioned, temporary building 
in Washington, D.C., located on the present site of the Federal Reserve Building, to 
vote the SEC into existence pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Frank V. 
Fowlkes, Agency Report/Congress Prods SEC To Get Firmer Grip on Nation’s 
Securities Industry, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Feb. 20, 1971, at 385. 
 2. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT 5, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2006.pdf [hereinafter 
2006 REPORT]. 
3.     One group of foreign investors, sovereign wealth funds, has received much 
attention by the press in recent years.  Sovereign wealth funds are estimated currently at 
$2.5 trillion and expected to grow to $10 to 15 trillion by 2015. Robert M. Kimmitt, 
Public Footprints in Private Markets, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 1-2, 
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87109/robert-m-kimmitt/pu 
blic-footprints-in-private-markets.html. 
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through direct or indirect costs, diminished returns, and reduced choice, 
the rules must be made with careful analysis and deliberation.  Congress 
acknowledged this potential harm in 1996 when it revised the SEC’s 
statutory mandate to expressly require the SEC “to consider or 
determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest” and to “consider, in addition to the protection of investors, 
whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.”4
This multidimensional aspect of investor protection applies not only 
to rulemaking, but also to enforcement matters.  Each enforcement 
matter involves in some degree a balancing of competing interests, some 
at a pragmatic, case-specific level and others at a higher policy level.  
For example, in distributing money recovered in an enforcement action 
against a bankrupt company, the SEC conceivably could decline a 
distribution to all investors and instead choose a distribution that favors 
one class of investor over another, such as common stockholders over 
senior debtholders, which by virtue of their preferred position may have 
had greater recovery per dollar invested than did common stockholders, 
but still fell short of their desired recovery.  In its overall enforcement 
program, the SEC’s decisions about resource allocation, charges to be 
brought, and relief to be sought may enhance the protection of one group 
of investors at the potential cost of another.  Advancing a novel legal 
theory may protect the group of investors in a particular case, but have 
unintended detrimental consequences to investors as a whole.5
The enforcement decisions of the SEC must be guided by the 
multidimensional nature of the SEC’s mission of protecting investors; 
maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitating capital 
formation.  The difficult choices of balancing conflicting interests must 
be guided by the transcendent principles of predictability, fairness, and 
transparency, culminating in the rule of law.  These principles are the 
defining characteristics of the U.S. markets. 
In order to assess the SEC’s application of these principles to its 
enforcement decisions, this Article investigates the shifting focus of the 
SEC’s enforcement program from its inception to the present day.  The 
Article explores the development and usage of the SEC’s statutory 
enforcement powers in the context of due process and fairness.  Finally, 
 4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006). 
5.     See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., – U.S. –, 
128 S.Ct. 761 (2008). 
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the Article calls for the Commission to appoint an independent advisory 
committee to conduct a detailed review and evaluation of the policies 
and procedures of the enforcement program in light of the changes in the 
SEC’s statutory authority over the course of the last three decades. 
 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SEC 
The SEC is governed by five commissioners, all of whom are 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.6  
One of the commissioners is designated as chairman by an executive 
order of the President.7  To ensure bipartisanship, Congress specified 
that only three of the five commissioners can belong to the same 
political party.8
The SEC is organized into four primary operating divisions and 
nineteen “offices,” or special service units, each of which is 
headquartered in Washington, D.C.  The SEC’s staff, numbering 
approximately 3500, is located in Washington, D.C. and throughout its 
eleven regional offices.9  The SEC’s largest division—and the focus of 
 6. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006). 
 7. See Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3175 (1950), reprinted 
in 5 U.S.C. 901 et seq. (2006), and in 64 Stat. 1265 (1950); see also 2006 REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 7.  This power of the President to designate (or remove) the chairman 
by executive order does not apply to similar agencies.  For example, the chairmen of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission are separately nominated and confirmed to their positions as chairmen, 
although they have separate terms as governor or commissioner, respectively. See 12 
U.S.C. § 242 (2008) and 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(B) (2008). 
 8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4.  The first five commissioners were 
Democrats Joseph P. Kennedy, James M. Landis and Ferdinand Pecora, and 
Republicans George C. Mathews and Robert E. Healy.  The commissioners elected 
Joseph P. Kennedy to serve as the first chairman. See Fowlkes, supra note 1, at 385. 
 9. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2007 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT 2, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2007.pdf [hereinafter 
2007 REPORT].  The SEC has grown tremendously since its inception.  In 1942, the SEC 
had a staff of 1700 employees.  In order to make room for wartime agencies, the SEC 
was forced to relocate to Philadelphia in 1942.  By the time it returned to Washington in 
1948, the staff had decreased to 1150.  By 1955, there were only 666 employees. 
Fowlkes, supra note 1, at 383. 
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this Article—is the Division of Enforcement, which has more than 1100 
employees, and has grown by more than 40% in the past fifteen years.10
THE SEC’S AUTHORITY UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
Today, the SEC is charged with administering the Securities Act of 
1933,11 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,12 the Trust Indenture Act 
of 1939,13 the Investment Company Act of 1940,14 the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940,15 and certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act,16 some of which fall outside of the earlier securities laws.17
The Commission is vested with statutory authority to conduct any 
investigation it deems necessary to determine whether a person has 
violated federal securities laws and the rules and regulations 
 10. The Enforcement Division is currently the largest of the divisions and offices of 
the SEC, with more than 1100 personnel. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, Opening 
Remarks to the Practising Law Institute’s SEC Speaks Series (Feb. 9, 2007), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch020907cc.htm.  According to information 
provided by the SEC to Congress, the total number of employees in the Enforcement 
Division at the end of fiscal year 2008 is expected to be 1124—up from 781 in 1992. 
 11. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006). 
 12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006); see generally 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact19 
34 (last visited May 8, 2008) (discussing some of the many powers granted by the 1934 
Act, including regulating corporate reporting, proxy solicitations and tender offers). 
 13. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2006) (focusing on 
debt securities such as bonds, debentures, and notes that are offered for public sale). 
 14. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to a-64 (2006) 
(regulating the organization of companies, including mutual funds, that engage 
primarily in investing, reinvesting, and trading in securities, and whose own securities 
are offered to the investing public). 
 15. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to b-21 (2006) 
(regulating investment advisors). 
 16. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.) (mandating a number of 
reforms to enhance corporate responsibility and financial disclosures and to combat 
corporate and accounting fraud).  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also created the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board to oversee the activities of the auditing 
profession.. 
 17. On February 8, 2006, the repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935 took effect, relieving the SEC of what once arguably was its primary focus.  The 
Act provided for the regulation of multi-state utilities by the SEC. Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (repealed 2006). 
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promulgated thereunder.18  As part of this investigative authority, the 
Commissioners—and any officer to whom the Commissioners’ authority 
is delegated—have the power to “administer oaths and affirmations, 
subpena [sic] witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence, and 
require the production of any books, papers, correspondence, 
memoranda, or other records which the Commission deems relevant or 
material to the inquiry.”19  The Commission has delegated these tasks to 
the Director of the Division of Enforcement, who undertakes them 
pursuant to formal orders that the Commission grants in individual 
matters.20  If the Commission concludes that a securities law has been 
violated, the Commission may bring an action in federal court or in an 
administrative proceeding against the purported violators. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION 
Among its various other roles, the SEC acts to enforce the federal 
securities laws,21 and it has built a strong reputation for professionalism 
and effectiveness in its enforcement program.  At the time the 
Commission was established in 1934, the Commission’s “Legal 
Division” was responsible for conducting investigations pertaining to 
federal securities law violations.22  Within the first two years, the 
Commission assigned that duty to its regional offices.23  For the next 
four decades, the regional offices were primarily responsible for 
conducting investigations and bringing enforcement actions while the 
Commission’s Trading and Markets Division “played a largely 
supervisory and coordinating role supporting the regions and referring 
criminal cases to the Justice Department for prosecution.”24  By 1944, 
 18. See e.g., Securities Act §§ 8(e), 20(a); Securities Exchange Act § 21(a); 
Investment Company Act § 42(a); Investment Advisers Act § 209(a). 
 19. Securities Exchange Act § 21(b).  Congress has granted similar authority in 
other provisions of the federal securities laws. See Investment Company Act § 42(b); 
Investment Advisers Act § 209(b). 
 20. 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-4(a)(1) (2008). 
 21. 2007 REPORT, supra note 9, at 2. 
 22. DANIEL M. HAWKE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 
1934-1981, at 2 (SEC Historical Society 2002), available at http://www.sechistorical.or 
g/collection/oralHistories/roundtables/enforcement/enforcementHistory.pdf. 
 23. Id.  A copy of the 1939 organization chart of the SEC is available at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1939_SEC_OrgChart.pdf. 
 24. Id.  During the SEC’s first decade, the Justice Department had a 95% 
conviction rate from the indictments that it brought based on referrals from the SEC. Id. 
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after only a decade of existence, the SEC had gathered information 
“concerning an aggregate of 44,399 persons against whom Federal or 
State action had been taken with regard to securities violations” and had 
obtained permanent injunctions against 1,057 firms and individuals.25
The second decade of the SEC’s existence was marked by World 
War II and its aftermath.  During the war, the SEC’s headquarters 
moved temporarily to Philadelphia to make room for wartime operations 
in Washington, D.C.26  When the SEC finally returned to Washington in 
1948, it occupied temporary buildings that were erected during the 
war.27  Despite the inconveniences caused by the war and post-war 
budget cuts, the SEC continued to bring a constant number of 
enforcement actions during this time.28
Beginning in the late 1950s and continuing through the 1960s, the 
enforcement program underwent a remarkable transformation, and the 
enforcement resources in the SEC’s Washington, D.C. headquarters 
increased.  With the added resources, the headquarters began to bring 
more actions for violations of the securities laws.  During the entire 
decade of the 1950s, the home office brought a total of approximately 
fifty cases.  Yet during the 1960s, that number escalated substantially – 
the home office brought approximately forty cases per year.29
The 1960s witnessed landmark decisions in the field of securities 
law in cases brought by the SEC, such as SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.30 
and SEC v. VTR, Inc.31  In Texas Gulf Sulfur, the Second Circuit adopted 
the SEC’s application of Rule 10b-5 to insider trading cases by requiring 
insiders in possession of material, nonpublic information either to 
abstain from trading on such information or to disclose such information 
at 13 (quoting TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, at 3). 
 25. Id. at 13 (citing TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, at 2-3).   
 26. Id. at 14. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 360-
61, 363 (3d ed. 2003).  The impetus for the transformation was the enforcement staff’s 
massive investigation into fraudulent practices by the American Stock Exchange. See 
HAWKE, supra note 22, at 2-3.   
 30. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
 31. See SEC v. VTR, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1309 (D.D.C. 1975). 
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before trading.32  In VTR, the SEC persuaded a federal district court to 
approve as a remedy for the securities law violation the appointment of 
independent directors and to order restitution.33  The VTR decision 
marked the beginning of a long series of civil cases obtaining ancillary 
relief in addition to an injunction against further misconduct.34
The growth in the number of actions being brought by the SEC 
sparked discussions, led by Chairman William J. Casey, about 
“concentrat[ing] resources by focusing all enforcement and investigative 
activity in one division.”35  In August 1972, the Commission 
reorganized the operating structure of its divisions by combining the 
enforcement programs of the divisions of Trading and Markets, 
Corporation Finance, and Investment Management into a newly created, 
stand-alone division.36  The new “Division of Enforcement” would 
oversee all enforcement actions brought by the SEC.37
 32. See Tex. Gulf Sulfur, 401 F. 2d at 848-52. 
 33. See VTR, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1309. 
 34. SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 362. 
 35. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION xxvii (1972), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1972.pdf.  It has been suggested that this 
reorganization was initially resisted on the 
belief that enforcement responsibility should not be separated from the divisions of 
the Commission that deal with substantive regulation.  The belief was that as the 
regulators developed new principles of regulation, if enforcement became too separate 
from such development, it might reflect the uncertainties of the rules and the 
appropriate nature of regulation. 
Symposium, Securities Law Enforcement Priorities, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 7, 9 
(1993) (statement by Leonard M. Leiman). 
 36. HAWKE, supra note 22, at 3.  In 1971, there were 40 lawyers in the enforcement 
group of the Division of Trading and Markets. Fowlkes, supra note 1, at 380.  The 
Commission, on November 14, 2007, restored the name of the “Division of Market 
Regulation” to the “Division of Trading and Markets.” See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Renames Division of Market Regulation as Division of Trading 
and Markets (Nov. 14, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-
229.htm.  The Commission changed the name of the “Division of Corporate 
Regulation” to the “Division of Investment Management” in 1972. See Interview by 
Richard Rowe with Allan Mostoff (Oct. 30, 2002), available at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/oralHistories/interviews/mostoff/mostoff100202
Transcript.pdf. 
 37. HAWKE, supra note 22, at 3. 
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THE WELLS COMMISSION AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS 
On January 27, 1972, in a speech to the New York State Bar 
Association underscoring the importance of cooperation and 
collaboration between the Commission and the securities bar, Chairman 
Casey announced the creation of an advisory committee38 to “review 
and evaluate the Commission’s enforcement policies and practices and 
to make such recommendations as they deemed appropriate.”39  
Chairman Casey called upon the private securities bar to contribute to 
improving the enforcement program by developing procedural 
safeguards to protect against abuses of the rights of prospective 
defendants.40  Stressing the value of input from the private sector, 
Chairman Casey explained: 
[I] consider it essential for the Commission to redouble its efforts to 
keep in touch with the best thinking on investor protection at the 
private bar, in the accounting profession, and in the financial 
community generally. As one step — and I hope that it will prove a 
significant step — toward that end, I have created a special 
committee of three highly experienced practicing lawyers who will 
at my request examine the SEC’s enforcement policy and practices, 
engage in frequent dialogue with the members of the Commission 
and with our staff, seek and sift the suggestions of the bar and make 
recommendations to the Commission for worthwhile improvements 
to our time-honored ways.41
Although the official name of the committee was the “Advisory 
Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices,” it is better known as 
the “Wells Committee” after its chairman, John A. Wells, a prominent 
lawyer and partner at the New York law firm of Royall, Koegel & 
 38. William J. Casey, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to the New 
York Bar Association (Jan. 27, 1972), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/19 
72/012772casey.pdf [hereinafter Casey Speech]. 
 39. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES (June 1, 1972), reprinted in ARTHUR F. 
MATHEWS ET AL., ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES 
LAWS 1973, at 275 (Practicing Law Institute 1973) [hereinafter WELLS COMMITTEE 
ADVISORY REPORT]; Memorandum from John A. Wells et al., Chairman, SEC Advisory 
Committee on Enforcement Policy and Practices (Mar. 2, 1972), available at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1972_0302_Casey.pdf [hereinafter 
Wells Memo]. 
   40.    Casey Speech, supra note 38, at 4-5. 
 41. Id.  
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Wells.42  The Wells Committee also included former SEC chairmen 
Ralph H. Demmler and Manual F. Cohen, both of whom had taken an 
active interest in the workings of the enforcement program.43  Howard 
G. Kristol, who served as special counsel to Chairman Casey, acted as a 
liaison to, and unofficial member of, the Wells Committee.44
The Wells Committee’s stated mandate45 was: first, “to advise on 
how the SEC’s enforcement objectives and strategies may be made still 
more effective;”46 second, to assess the due process implications of the 
enforcement practices;47 third, to evaluate the enforcement policies and 
procedures;48 fourth, “to make recommendations on the appropriate 
blend of regulation, publicity and formal enforcement action and on 
methods of furthering voluntary compliance;”49 and fifth, “to make 
recommendations on criteria for the selection and disposition of 
enforcement actions and on the adequacy of . . . sanctions imposed in 
Commission proceedings.”50
The Wells Committee was composed of three of the brightest minds 
of the securities bar, but the Committee did not conduct extensive, 
independent research and analysis.  Instead, the Committee solicited 
comments from persons outside the Commission who were affected by 
the SEC’s enforcement activities to “determine whether fairness could 
be more certainly assured, consistent with the need for effective 
enforcement.”51  The Wells Committee started its work in January 1972 
and published a detailed report with forty-three recommendations for the 
Commission in June of the same year—an impressive achievement by 
any measure.52  The report represented a candid and honest assessment 
of the enforcement program and reflected the substantial input the 
Committee received from the private bar. 
 42. Id. at 5-6.  John Wells later formed a well-known law firm called Rogers & 
Wells. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Howard G. Kristol—Biography, available at http://www.duanemorris.com/atto 
rneys/howardgkristol.html (last visited May 9, 2008). 
 45. Wells Memo, supra note 39. 
 46. Id. at 1. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 2. 
 50. Id. 
 51. WELLS COMMITTEE ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 39, at 3. 
 52. Id. at ii-viii. 
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The Wells Committee Recommendations 
The most significant recommendations, from the perspective of a 
person defending against an SEC enforcement proceeding, are numbers 
16, 17 and 20 of the report:53
16.  Except where the nature of the case precludes, a prospective 
defendant or respondent should be notified of the substance of the 
staff’s charges and probable recommendations in advance of the 
submission of the staff memorandum to the Commission 
recommending the commencement of an enforcement action and be 
accorded an opportunity to submit a written statement to the staff 
which would be forwarded to the Commission together with the staff 
memorandum. 
17.  The procedures whereby a prospective defendant or respondent is 
permitted to present to the Commission his side of the case prior to 
authorization of an enforcement action should be reflected in a rule 
or published release. 
*       *       * 
20.  The Commission should adopt procedures permitting discussions 
of settlement between the staff and the prospective defendant or 
respondent prior to the authorization of a proceeding.54
These three recommendations became the impetus for what is now 
known as the “Wells Submission.” 
Providing prospective defendants with notice of potential charges 
and allowing them to respond, as reflected in Recommendations 16 and 
17, was not a novel concept within the walls of the SEC.  Even prior to 
the report of the Wells Committee, the SEC, under Chairman Hamer 
Budge, had afforded prospective defendants an opportunity to be heard 
by the Commission.  A September 1, 1970, internal directive of the 
Commission55 required the Enforcement staff to include within its 
 
 53. Harvey L. Pitt et al., SEC Enforcement Process, Internationalization of the 
Securities Markets – Business Trends and Regulatory Policy, C489 ALI-ABA 109, 238 
(1989). 
 54. WELLS COMMITTEE ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 39, at iv-v. 
 55. See Fowlkes, supra note 1 (describing the positions of the commissioners).  It 
should be noted that this directive was supported by commissioners of both political 
parties. 
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memoranda recommending action by the Commission “any arguments 
or contentions as to either the facts or the law . . . which have [been] 
advanced by the prospective respondents and which countervail those 
made by the staff . . . .”56  The purpose of the procedure was “to afford 
the Commission an opportunity to consider the position of the 
prospective defendant or respondent on any contested matters prior to 
authorization of a proceeding.”57
The Wells Committee observed that “[a]s a practical matter, only 
experienced practitioners who are aware of the opportunity to present 
their client’s side of the case have made use of [such] procedures.”58  
The Committee felt that the process of providing notice to prospective 
defendants and allowing them to respond to the allegations before the 
Commission formally charged them was critical to protecting their rights 
and ensuring overall fairness.59  The Committee recommended that the 
Commission codify the procedure through formal rulemaking.60
Unlike Recommendations 16 and 17, Recommendation 20 of the 
Wells Committee—to allow the staff to engage in preliminary settlement 
negotiations with a prospective defendant before the Commission 
authorized a proceeding61—was a significant departure from then-
existing procedure.  The 1970 internal directive required the staff to seek 
approval from the Commission to bring an action or proceeding prior to 
discussing its settlement.62  Under the 1970 internal directive, the 
Enforcement staff could allow a defendant or respondent to present 
proposals and arguments prior to Commission authorization, so long as 
that person initiated the discussions.63  The staff, however, was 
precluded from negotiating settlement terms or disclosing to the 
defendant or respondent the “recommendation it intend[ed] to make to 
the Commission.”64  This process, which itself represented a departure 
from prior procedure for negotiating settlements, grew out of a concern 
 56. This 1970 directive was made public solely as a result of pretrial discovery in 
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corporation. See SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. 
Corp., 68 F.R.D. 157, 166 appx. A (D.D.C. 1975) [hereinafter 1970 Internal Directive]. 
 57. WELLS COMMITTEE ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 39, at 31. 
 58. Id. at 31-32. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 32. 
 61. WELLS COMMITTEE ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 39, at iv-v. 
 62. 1970 Internal Directive, supra note 56, at 165. 
 63. See id.  The staff was permitted to discuss the facts and nature of the alleged 
violations. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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by the Commission that “its discretionary authority regarding the 
institution of proceedings [would be] substantially impaired.”65  
According to Commissioner A. Sydney Herlong, the 1970 internal 
directive was designed to prevent the staff from “bludgeoning” 
companies into consent settlements by using the threat of public 
proceedings that might never be approved.66  Commissioner Herlong, 
who was one of two Democrats on the Commission, explained: 
The staff sometimes is overly zealous and they sometimes want 
quick settlements to clear up their files.  Sometimes they would beat 
people over the head for a consent decree.  We had reports from 
some people who weren’t pleased with the treatment.67
Responding to comment letters, the Wells Committee 
recommended that the Commission withdraw this mandate and return to 
the prior procedure of allowing staff leeway to negotiate settlements 
with prospective defendants prior to having the authority to commence 
an action or proceeding.68  The Wells Committee believed that “frank 
discussions between the staff and opposing counsel concerning the 
staff’s conclusions and probable recommendation to the Commission 
would encourage settlements.”69  To address concerns with abuse, the 
Committee proposed that the Director of Enforcement or a regional 
administrator be responsible for supervising settlement negotiations and 
that the proposed defendant or respondent be shown the evidence that 
the staff has assembled in support of its case.70  As the Wells Committee 
observed, “When the staff refuses to disclose its evidence or the theory 
of its case to the respondent’s attorney before the hearing, the attorney, 
 65. WELLS COMMITTEE ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 39, at 35.  Philip A. 
Loomis, then general counsel of the SEC, explained that the Commission abandoned 
the practice of considering settlements negotiated without prior Commission 
authorization because the Commissioners felt hindered by a pre-decided result. See 
Fowlkes, supra note 1, at 381.  Commissioner Richard B. Smith “offered essentially the 
same reason, saying that he missed the opportunity to hear industry’s side of a case and 
that it struck him as bad administrative procedure.” Id. 
 66. Fowlkes, supra note 1, at 381. 
 67. Id. 
 68. WELLS COMMITTEE ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 39, at 35. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 35-36. 
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not knowing what his client faces, may be unable or reluctant to 
recommend a settlement.”71
The Wells Committee recommendation of a return to the pre-1970 
procedure of allowing staff to negotiate settlements prior to Commission 
approval was met with favor by many members of the securities bar.  In 
a May 23, 1972 letter to the Wells Committee concerning the proposed 
change, Arthur F. Mathews, a former SEC enforcement lawyer, wrote: 
[T]he changed enforcement policy has, although unintended, worked 
to the severe detriment of many defendants and prospective 
defendants who wish to achieve an acceptable consent settlement in 
lieu of litigation and who are not concerned that the Staff might 
“bludgeon” them.  Rather, such persons usually are concerned with 
the continuing blasts of adverse publicity showering upon them, first 
by public institution of charges by the Commission, and later upon 
the conduct of a hearing or the announcement of the terms and 
conditions of a settlement subsequently negotiated.  Such continuous 
publicity may be extremely unfair, particularly where serious 
allegations publicized upon institution of an action, are dropped 
subsequently by Staff and the Commission in accepting a consent 
settlement of the action.72
The notable aspect of this debate is that both sides were concerned 
with fairness and due process.  Those in support of requiring 
Commission approval prior to settlement were concerned with the 
uneven negotiating position of the Commission’s staff and the 
prospective defendant.  Those in support of allowing informal settlement 
procedures prior to Commission approval believed that fairness would 
be advanced by limiting the time under which a prospective defendant 
could be exposed to adverse publicity.  The ultimate conclusion of the 
Commission, however, emphasized the due process concerns of 
Commission oversight. 
 71. Id. at 37.  Today, there are no specific guidelines concerning the amount and 
type of information that staff must share with a prospective defendant, so practices vary 
among the staff and across the regional offices. 
 72. Letter from Arthur F. Mathews of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, to the Advisory 
Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices 30 (May 23, 1972).  Stanley Sporkin, 
then an associate director, agreed, stating that “it saved everybody a lot of bother and 
was welcomed by many of the people we regulate because it gave them a means of 
settling quickly.” Fowlkes, supra note 1, at 381. 
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The Commission’s Response to the Wells Recommendations 
The recommendations of the Wells Committee were met with 
mixed responses within the agency.  Although the private securities bar 
generally applauded the recommendations from the Wells Committee, 
the SEC staff disagreed with many of them, and the commissioners were 
reluctant to adopt formal rules.73  With respect to Recommendations 16 
and 17, the Commission “agree[d] that the objective [was] sound,” but 
“concluded that it would not be in the public interest to adopt formal 
rules for that purpose.”74  The Commission apparently felt hamstrung by 
the mandatory-sounding nature of the phrase “except where the nature of 
the case precludes.”  The Commission believed that the formal adoption 
of the proposals “could seriously limit the scope and timeliness” of 
enforcement actions and inject issues “irrelevant to the merits.”75  As a 
result, the Commission indicated that, where “practical and appropriate,” 
it would allow, on an informal basis, prospective defendants to provide 
written submissions before a charging decision was reached by the 
Commission.76
Although it did not immediately embrace Recommendations 16 and 
17, the Commission eventually adopted the substance of these 
recommendations in procedural rules in November 1972, formulating 
today’s Wells submission process.  The process as adopted provided a 
proposed defendant or respondent with the opportunity to respond to 
charges.77  The Commission notified the public of the opportunity for 
prospective defendants or respondents to “submit a written statement to 
the Commission setting forth their interests and positions in regard to the 
subject matter of the investigation.”78  SEC procedural rules directed the 
staff, in its discretion, to advise prospective defendants or respondents 
“of the general nature of its investigation, including the indicated 
violations as they pertain to them, and the amount of time that may be 
available for preparing and submitting a statement prior to the 
 
 73. See Pitt et al., supra note 53, at 63. 
 74. Procedures Relating to the Commencement of Enforcement Proceedings and 
Termination of Staff Investigation, Securities Act Release No. 5310, [1972-1973 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 79,010, at 82,183-86 (Sept. 22, 1972) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 5310]. 
 75. Id. at 2. 
 76. Stephen A. Glasser, SEC Adopts Rules Changes in Areas of Enforcement, 
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 29, 1972. 
 77. See 37 Fed. Reg. 23,829 (Nov. 9, 1972) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c)). 
 78. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (2006). 
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presentation of a staff recommendation to the Commission for the 
commencement of an administrative or injunctive proceeding.”79  The 
Commission, however, explained that a prospective defendant’s 
opportunity to submit a response was not absolute, and the Commission 
expressly reserved the right to take any action while awaiting a 
submission by a proposed defendant or respondent.80
The Commission rejected Recommendation 20 of the Wells 
Committee, which would have permitted settlement discussions prior to 
authorization from the Commission to commence an action or 
proceeding.81  Apparently, the Commission continued to harbor 
concerns that its discretionary authority regarding the institution of 
proceedings would be substantially impaired.82  Irving Pollack, then 
director of the Division of Enforcement, explained the reason for 
rejecting the recommendation as two-fold: first, it would be difficult for 
the Commission to reject a settlement already reached between staff and 
a prospective defendant; second, there was concern that settlement 
discussions prior to Commission approval would give the staff the 
leverage to threaten prospective defendants into submission.83  
Therefore, the procedure described in the 1970 internal directive of 
requiring the staff to seek Commission approval to bring an action prior 
to negotiating settlement of it remained in effect. 
In 1979, the Commission, under Chairman Harold Williams,84 
formally adopted in the SEC procedural rules the requirement that the 
enforcement staff must have Commission authorization before engaging 
in settlement discussions.85  The Commission reasoned that its 
involvement in settlement discussions was critical to ensuring a fair 
process and to protecting the rights of defendants.86
 79. Id. 
 80. See SEC Release No. 5310, supra note 74, at 2. 
 81. WELLS COMMITTEE ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 39, at 34. 
 82. Id. at 35. 
 83. Glasser, supra note 76. 
 84. Harold M. Williams—Biography, http://skadden.com/index.cfm?contentID=45 
&bioID=848 (last visited May 8, 2008).  During his tenure, Chairman Williams 
increased the Office of the General Counsel from approximately a dozen attorneys to 
more than forty attorneys as an alternative source of advice to the Commission on 
issues such as enforcement matters. 
 85. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(f) (2006). 
 86. John M. Fedders, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Remarks to the 1981 SEC Accounting Conference Foundation for Accounting 
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Although the Commission did not adopt all of the forty-three 
specific recommendations, the most obvious legacy of the Wells 
Committee was the adoption of the “Wells Process,” a process whereby 
prospective defendants or respondents are afforded an opportunity to 
submit a writing—essentially a brief—to the Commission and its staff 
after the staff’s investigation is completed, but before the staff has made 
a recommendation to the Commission.  Under this procedure, a 
prospective defendant or respondent enjoys due process—a hallmark of 
our Anglo-American judicial system. 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM AND ITS PHILOSOPHY 
Prior to 1990, the SEC’s statutory purpose for enforcing the 
securities laws was to provide remedial relief for aggrieved investors 
and to deter future violations.87  The enforcement program began by 
serving primarily a remedial purpose, through the Commission’s 
injunctive powers and the disgorgement remedies that the Commission 
fashioned.88  In the decades following the Wells Committee, the 
Commission’s enforcement actions began to shift from remedial to 
punitive in nature.  This shift of emphasis arose from the new powers 
that Congress gave the SEC, such as the authority to impose officer and 
director bars, penalties against individuals and registered entities, and 
censures in administrative actions. 
In 1984, the SEC staff, in response to a congressional request, 
prepared a review of the adequacy of enforcement sanctions and 
remedies.89  The resulting report stated that “[t]he federal securities laws 
are presently viewed by the courts as remedial rather than punitive” and 
Education: New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants 3-6 (Nov. 16, 
1981). 
 87. See, e.g., Memorandum from John S.R. Shad, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, to Rep. Timothy E. Wirth, Chairman, Subcomm. Telecomms., Consumer 
Prot., & Fin. of the H. Energy and Commerce Comm. 350 (Feb. 22, 1984) [hereinafter 
Memorandum to Chairman Wirth].
 88. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(“The deterrent effect of an SEC enforcement action would be greatly undermined if 
securities law violators were not required to disgorge illegal profits.”); SEC v. 
Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he primary 
purpose of disgorgement is not to compensate investors. . . . [I]t is a method of forcing a 
defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched.”). 
 89. See Memorandum to Chairman Wirth, supra note 87 (transmitting “Results of 
the Review of the Adequacy of Enforcement Remedies and Sanctions”). 
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that the SEC’s non-monetary remedies were “effective in most cases” in 
providing that remedial relief.90  The staff reported that, aside from the 
area of insider trading, which Congress was addressing at the time,91 
“the Commission has been unable to identify a serious need for 
additional remedies to deter a specific type of conduct.”92
The report asserted that “the advantages of seeking additional civil 
penalties appear to be marginal” and “must be balanced against a 
number of potentially serious disadvantages.”93  Chief among those 
identified disadvantages was the concern that giving the SEC the 
authority to seek or impose civil monetary penalties for violations of the 
federal securities laws would “change the character of the enforcement 
program from remedial to punitive, [and] might lead the judiciary to be 
less receptive to the SEC’s injunctive actions.”94  Traditionally, the 
Commission relied on the Department of Justice to exercise these 
remedies through its criminal authority.95
By the late 1980s, these philosophical views substantially changed.  
In a memorandum in support of the Securities Enforcement Act of 1989, 
the Commission stated that “variable-penalty provisions are appropriate 
to penalize and deter the broad range of conduct for which these 
penalties will be assessed.”96  The Commission conceded that moving to 
remedies that were more punitive in nature could result in one of two 
things: increased difficulty in obtaining settlements as a result of 
defendants’ unwillingness to settle cases involving large civil penalties, 
thereby potentially harming aggrieved investors, or a greater likelihood 
of settlement by defendants hoping to avoid much larger civil monetary 
penalties after litigation.97  The Commission’s asserted need in 1990 to 
penalize a broad range of conduct was a significant departure from its 
 90. Id. 
 91. Congress was considering proposed legislation that eventually became the 
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-376, § 1, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 92. Memorandum to Chairman Wirth, supra note 87, at 350. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in Support of the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, 
reprinted in H.R. No. 975, 101st Cong., at 7 (emphasis added) [hereinafter SEC 
Memorandum in Support of Remedies Act]. 
 97. Memorandum to Chairman Wirth, supra note 87, at 350-51. 
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representation to Congress only six years earlier that its existing 
remedies were effective.98
In 1990, former Director of Enforcement Gary Lynch, who had 
recently left the SEC, testified before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Securities.  Although he testified in favor of providing additional penalty 
powers to the Commission, he cautioned: 
I think it is important for the Commission to maintain its historical 
focus on achieving remedial relief, rather than taking punitive action 
in every case, and that the Commission should still continue to judge 
the effectiveness of the Commission’s enforcement program based 
on what it actually accomplishes, as opposed to what the dollar 
amount is that is ordered in a particular case.99
Congress provided the SEC with enhanced enforcement remedies, 
including expanded remedial powers and new penalty authority.  These 
powers were included in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,100 
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,101 
and the Securities and Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform 
Act of 1990.102
As a result of these laws, the SEC gained three significant new sets 
of powers: (1) the ability to seek civil monetary penalties against 
persons and entities that may have violated federal securities laws; (2) 
the authority to bar directors and officers of public companies from 
serving in those capacities if they violated federal antifraud provisions; 
and (3) the authority to issue administrative cease-and-desist orders, 
temporary restraining orders, and orders for disgorgement of ill-gotten 
profits to violators of federal securities laws.  These significant powers 
and laws enabling them are discussed in more detail below. 
 98. Id. at 350. 
 99. The Securities Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Sec. 
Subcomm. of the S. Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs Comm. (Feb. 1, 1990) (statement 
of Gary G. Lynch, Fmr. Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n). 
 100. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 1, 98 Stat. 1264 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 101. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-704, § 1, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 102. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. 
L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990). 
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The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 
In connection with its enhanced enforcement efforts with respect to 
insider trading,103 the SEC submitted proposed legislation to Congress 
on September 27, 1982, that would authorize the SEC to seek (and a 
United States District Court to impose) civil monetary penalties of up to 
three times the profit realized or loss avoided in insider trading cases.104  
At the time of the proposal, the SEC’s primary weapons “against insider 
trading [were] injunction[s] requiring a defendant to comply with the 
law in the future, and ancillary equitable relief in the form of 
disgorgement of illegal profits.”105  Previously, the power to seek 
“penalties” in the form of prison sentences, criminal fines and restitution 
resided solely in the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and state authorities. 
As a result of the growing number of insider trading cases, the 
Commission believed that its existing tools of injunctions and 
disgorgement were inadequate to deter persons from trading on material, 
nonpublic information.  Injunctions, the Commission explained, merely 
order a defendant prospectively to comply with existing law, and do “not 
penalize the defendant for the illegal conduct for which the injunction 
was imposed.”106  The Commission viewed the remedy of disgorgement 
as likewise inadequate because it merely “strips the defendant of the 
fruits of his unlawful trading and returns him to the position he was in 
before he broke the law.”107  Apparently discounting the possible 
criminal sanctions and the reputational harm associated with injunctive 
and ancillary relief, the Commission explained to Congress, “[A]n 
insider who is caught improperly profiting from the use of material 
information is placed in no worse a position than the honest man who 
refuses to act.”108
 
 103. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in Support of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1982, reprinted in H.R. 
REP. No. 98-355, 98th Cong., at 18 (1984), and in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2293 
[hereinafter SEC Memorandum in Support of Insider Trading Sanction Act]. 
 104. Letter from John Shad, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Hon. Thomas 
P. O’Neill, Jr., with accompanying memorandum (Sept. 27, 1982), reprinted in H.R. 
REP. No. 98-355, 98th Cong., at 18 (1984), and in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2292. 
 105. SEC Memorandum in Support of Insider Trading Sanction Act, supra note 103, 
at 24. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. (quoting HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID, REPORT FOR THE U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE: AN EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND POTENTIAL USE OF CIVIL 
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In response, Congress passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 
1984 (“ITSA”), which was signed into law on August 10, 1984.  ITSA 
authorized treble damages in insider trading cases109 and increased the 
maximum criminal fine for Exchange Act violations to $100,000.110  
ITSA was the first significant legislation that provided the SEC with the 
authority to penalize, and it was premised on the Commission’s limited 
belief that penalties in the form of monetary sanctions were necessary to 
deter the specific securities law violation of insider trading.111  At that 
time, the Commission believed that existing remedies were effective 
against other securities law violations. 
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 
After the passage of ITSA, Congress continued to evaluate whether 
the legislation was sufficient to deter insider trading.112  In the mid-
1980s, insider-trading scandals dominated the financial news and 
involved such high-profile Wall Street traders as Ivan Boesky, Michael 
Milken, and Dennis Levine.113  Insider trading became the focus of 
Congressional hearings in June and July 1986 and continued to be the 
focus of hearings for the next several years.114
In 1988, members of the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce introduced additional legislation “[a]fter learning of an 
increasing number of serious insider trading cases.”115  The new 
 
MONEY PENALTIES AS A SANCTION BY THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 36 
(1972)). 
 109. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 
1264 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 110. See id. § 3.  Previously, the maximum criminal fine for Exchange Act 
violations was $10,000. Id. 
 111. See Memorandum to Chairman Wirth, supra note 87 (transmitting “Results of 
the Review of the Adequacy of Enforcement Remedies and Sanctions”). 
 112. See Thomas J. Woo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider 
Trading in the 1980s (The Berkeley Electronic Press, Working Paper No. 941, 2006), 
available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4566&context=expres 
so. 
 113. Id. at 7. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Stuart J. Kaswell, An Insider’s View of the Insider Trading and Securities 
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 BUS. LAW. 145 (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-
910, 100th Cong., at 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044 (“The 
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 represents the response 
of [the House Committee on Energy and Commerce] to a series of revelations over the 
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legislation, the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 
1988 (“ITSFEA”), was prompted by an “unstated premise that broker-
dealers in particular, and others in general, were not doing enough to 
detect and deter insider trading.”116
Congress passed ITSFEA and President Reagan signed it into law 
in November 1988.  The new law extended the SEC’s authority to 
impose penalties on persons who control a person who trades on 
material nonpublic information in violation of the law,117 and it required 
broker-dealers and investment advisers to “establish, maintain, and 
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed . . . to 
prevent the misuse . . . of material, nonpublic information.”118  ITSFEA 
extended the DOJ’s criminal authority by: (1) increasing maximum 
criminal fines for Exchange Act violations to $1,000,000 for individuals 
and $2,500,000 for non-natural persons;119 (2) increasing the maximum 
duration of imprisonment to ten years;120 and (3) authorizing the 
payment of a reward to those “persons who provide information leading 
to the imposition of [a] penalty.”121  ITSFEA also vested private 
plaintiffs with authority to assist in the deterrence effort by creating an 
express private right of action against insiders who trade on material 
nonpublic information.122
The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock 
Reform Act of 1990 
In October 1987, prior to the passage of the ITSFEA, the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting—dubbed the “Treadway 
Commission” after its chairman, former SEC Commissioner James C. 
Treadway, Jr.—published a comprehensive report that identified causes 
of financial reporting fraud and issued recommendations for their 
 
last two years concerning serious episodes of abusive and illegal practices on Wall 
Street.”). 
 116. Kaswell, supra note 115, at 156. 
 117. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-704, § 3, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C).  
The penalty authorized for such control persons could not exceed the greater of three 
times the profit realized or loss avoided or $1,000,000. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. § 4. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. § 3. 
 122. Id. § 5. 
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reduction.123  The Treadway Commission Report recommended the 
creation of additional SEC enforcement remedies, namely the imposition 
of fines outside the limited context of insider trading cases, cease-and-
desist orders and corporate officer and director bars or suspensions.124  
The stated purpose of these proposals was to afford the Commission 
“[t]he ability to tailor enforcement actions more precisely to particular 
facts[,] [thereby] enabl[ing] the SEC to maximize its enforcement 
effectiveness.”125  In response to the Treadway Commission Report, the 
chairman directed the staff to develop legislative recommendations in 
response to the conclusions of the Treadway Commission.126
Although the House Committee on Energy and Commerce 
anticipated taking up the SEC’s legislative proposals in response to the 
Treadway Commission at the same time the House Committee 
considered ITSFEA,127 the SEC was unable to complete its proposals in 
time for inclusion in that legislation.128  To prompt the SEC to submit 
additional legislative proposals, Congress added section 3(c) to ITSFEA, 
which directed the Commission to submit to Congress “any 
recommendations the Commission considers appropriate with respect to 
the extension of the Commission’s authority to seek civil penalties or 
impose administrative fines.”129
After ITSFEA was passed, but before it was signed into law, the 
Commission submitted to Congress its first recommended legislative 
response to the recommendations of the Treadway Commission.130  The 
Commission initially asked for the authority to seek civil penalties in all 
administrative proceedings, including in proceedings against issuers 
under explicit, limited circumstances. 
In a memorandum to Congress, the Commission, under Chairman 
David Ruder, set forth the factors that should be considered in 
determining whether to seek a civil penalty against an issuer in an 
 123. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FRAUDULENT FIN. REPORTING, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING (1987), available at 
http://www.coso.org/Publications/NCFFR.pdf. 
 124. See id. at 64-67. 
 125. Id. at 64. 
 126. Kaswell, supra note 115, at 171. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act § 3. 
 130. See H.R. REP. No. 101-616, 101th Cong., at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379. 
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administrative proceeding.131  First, the SEC underscored that the 
proposed law would not “dictate” that the Commission must seek or 
impose a civil penalty against an issuer.132  Instead, as the Commission 
explained, the Commission could proceed against culpable individuals 
and exercise discretion in not seeking an issuer penalty.133  Second, the 
Commission stressed that it “may properly take into account its concern 
that civil penalties assessed against corporate issuers will ultimately be 
paid by shareholders who were themselves victimized by the 
violations.”134  The Commission explained that penalties should be 
assessed against issuers only in the rare situation where the issuer 
received a “direct economic benefit” from the fraud: 
In a typical case of financial fraud in which a[n] issuer overstates 
it[s] earnings and revenues, for example, the only shareholders who 
reap a direct economic benefit are those who sell their shares at an 
inflated price before the fraud is exposed.  By the time that an 
enforcement action is brought, a large percentage of the shareholders 
may consist of persons who purchased shares at a price that was 
artificially inflated as a result of the fraud.  To assess a civil penalty 
in such a case against the issuer, as opposed to the individual 
officers who were responsible for the fraud, would appear to be 
inequitable.135
The Commission further elaborated in a footnote on the limited 
instances where shareholders of a company might have received a direct 
economic benefit from fraud: 
The lack of a direct economic benefit to shareholders differentiates 
financial fraud from other types of violations for which public 
companies may be fined under other statutes.  For example, if a 
corporation violates environmental standards relating to emissions 
control, it generally realizes a cost saving that is ultimately realized 
by shareholders.136
Third, the Commission stated that a civil penalty should be imposed 
on an issuer “only where the violation resulted in an improper benefit to 
 131. SEC Memorandum in Support of Insider Trading Sanction Act, supra note 103, 
at 4. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (emphasis added). 
 136. Id. at 4 n.5 
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shareholders,” but that, even under those circumstances, the passage of 
time and resulting shareholder turnover may weigh against imposing a 
penalty.137
Central to the Commission’s analysis of the propriety of seeking a 
penalty against an individual or an issuer was whether the penalty would 
serve a “public interest.”138  To that point, the Commission outlined 
several additional factors it would consider to determine if the penalty 
was in the public interest: 
 
• whether the act or omission for which such penalty is 
assessed involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate 
or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement; 
• the harm to other persons resulting either directly or 
indirectly from such act or omission; 
• the extent to which any person was unjustly enriched, 
taking into account any restitution made to persons injured 
by such behavior;139 
• whether such person previously has been found by the 
Commission, other appropriate regulatory agency, or self-
regulatory organization to have violated the federal 
securities laws, state securities laws, or the rules of a self-
regulatory organization, or has been enjoined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction from violations of such laws or rules; 
• the need to deter such person and other persons from 
committing such acts or omissions; and 
• such other matters as justice may require.140 
 
In its February 1, 1990, “modified proposal” to Congress, the 
Commission removed its request for the authority to seek civil monetary 
 137. Id. at 5. 
 138. Id. at 9. 
 139. Id. (emphasis added); compare Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties 
(Jan. 4, 2006) (omitting this clause), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-
4.htm. 
 140. SEC Memorandum in Support of Insider Trading Sanction Act, supra note 103, 
at 9. 
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penalties against issuers in administrative proceedings.141  The 
Commission also removed its prior request for authority to impose 
officer and director bars in administrative proceedings.142  The modified 
proposal added provisions that expressly authorized the SEC to issue 
cease-and-desist orders and to order disgorgement in administrative 
proceedings, and allowed federal courts to bar persons from serving as 
directors or officers.143  The Commission’s “modified proposal” 
eventually became law through the “the Securities Enforcement 
Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,” commonly referred to 
as “The Remedies Act.” 
As enacted, the Remedies Act significantly expanded the 
permissible enforcement remedies the Commission may seek in civil 
proceedings or impose in administrative proceedings.144  The Remedies 
Act formulated a three-tiered penalty framework, which sets forth the 
amount of a fine based on the number and nature of violations.145  At 
each tier, the fine may not exceed the higher of the gross pecuniary gain 
or the maximum statutory amount.146  This variable penalty framework 
was not in the original draft of the Remedies Act but was later included 
to reflect the Commission’s belief that variable penalties would aid in 
 141. See The Securities Law Enforcement Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 647 Before 
the S. Subcomm. on Sec., 101st Cong. 31 (1990) (statement by Richard C. Breeden, 
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. For a general discussion of each class of remedies created by the Remedies Act, 
see Richard A. Spehr & Michelle J. Annunziata, The Remedies Act Turns Fifteen: What 
is its Relevance Today?, 1 N.Y.U J. L. & BUS. 587, 589-95 (2005). 
 145. See The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990, S. REP. No. 101-
337, 101st Cong. (1990).  Originally, there were three tiers of maximum penalty 
amounts separated according to the gravity and extent of harm caused by the violation, 
and each penalty is per violation.  For SEC administrative proceedings, the first tier 
penalty was $5,000 for natural citizens and $50,000 for any other person.  The second 
tier maximum penalty was $50,000 for natural persons and $250,000 for any other 
person and applies to violations involving fraud, deceit, manipulation or deliberate or 
reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement.  The third-tier penalty for natural 
persons was $100,000 and $500,000 for any other person and applies to violations that 
either resulted in substantial losses to other persons or created the risk of such losses.  
These amounts have been increased by subsequent regulation. See 17 C.F.R. 201.1001, 
et seq. (citing the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996). 
 146. See id. 
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tailoring the size of the penalty to fit the circumstances of individual 
cases.147
The Remedies Act further gave the SEC the power to seek (and an 
administrative law judge to impose) civil penalties through 
administrative proceedings against specified persons and entities directly 
regulated by the Commission, such as broker-dealers and investment 
advisors, when a penalty would be in the “public interest.”148  The 
Remedies Act also gave the SEC the power to seek civil monetary 
penalties against issuers, but only in federal court proceedings.  
Although Congress understood that imposing civil monetary penalties 
on issuers would harm shareholders,149 Congress expected that the SEC 
would exercise discretion and seek civil monetary penalties against 
issuers only when a violation resulted in improper benefits to 
shareholders.150
Congress took comfort in the fact that federal judges would operate 
as an independent check to the Commission’s decision to seek an issuer 
penalty and the amount sought to be recovered.  The concern among 
members of Congress and internally at the SEC was that if the same 
remedies were available to the SEC under both judicial and 
administrative proceedings, then the SEC might be perceived to have an 
incentive to conduct more enforcement actions through its own 
 147. See SEC Memorandum in Support of Insider Trading Sanction Act, supra note 
103, at 49; see also S. REP. No. 101-337, 101st Cong. (1990) 
 148. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 202, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (for certain Exchange Act violations); 
id. § 301 (for certain Investment Company Act violations); id. § 402 (for certain 
Advisers Act violations). 
 149. See The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 647 
Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec., 101st Cong. 85 (1990) (statement by Sen. John Heinz) 
(“Doesn’t the imposition of a fine against a publicly held company penalize the 
shareholder?”). 
 150. See S. REP No. 101-337, 101st Cong. 16-17 (1990).  Echoing the Commission’s 
intent, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs stated that it 
intends that a penalty be sought when the violation results in an improper benefit to 
shareholders.  In cases in which shareholders are the principal victims of the 
violations, the Committee expects that the SEC, when appropriate, will seek penalties 
from the individual offenders acting for a corporate issuer.  Moreover, in deciding 
whether and to what extent to assess a penalty against the issuer, the court may 
properly take into account whether civil penalties assessed against corporate issue[r]s 
will ultimately be paid by shareholders who were themselves victimized by the 
violations. 
Id. at 17. 
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administrative proceedings, rather than before a federal district court 
judge.  The final legislation did not include penalty authority in 
administrative proceedings precisely because there would be no 
oversight by Article III judges as there would be in civil proceedings.  In 
practice, however, public companies seldom choose to litigate with the 
SEC, and settled injunctive actions rarely receive any detailed judicial 
scrutiny.  To guarantee the safeguards that normally accompany a 
judicial determination of a penalty, commissioners must exercise 
sufficient, policy-level scrutiny, such as the “public interest” analysis 
described above, in evaluating a penalty recommendation.151
After the Remedies Act was signed into law in 1990 and before the 
SEC’s April 2002 Xerox case,152 the Commission brought only four 
issuer-penalty cases, totaling less than $5 million.153  The Xerox case, in 
which the company paid a $10 million penalty, is viewed by many as the 
beginning of the “corporate penalty era” at the Commission.  Between 
the Xerox case and the date this Article was written, the Commission 
has imposed penalties against approximately sixty issuers, totaling 
billions of dollars. 
THE CORPORATE SCANDALS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY 
In the first years of this century, the investing public was scarred by 
major corporate scandals leading to the demise of several large 
companies such as Enron Corp.154 and WorldCom Inc.155 that were 
151.    In January 2006, the Commission issued a statement outlining the parameters 
under which it would consider seeking penalties against issuers. See infra, text 
accompanying notes 178-181. 
 152. Xerox Corp., Litigation Release No. 17465, 77 SEC Docket 971, 2002 WL 
535379 (Apr. 11, 2002). 
 153. There were large penalties against registered entities during this period. See, 
e.g., Press Release, Department of Justice and SEC Enter $290 Million Settlement with 
Solomon Brothers in Treasury Securities Case, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/pu 
blic/press_releases/1992/211182.htm.  These penalties are not discussed in this Article 
because they were levied against registered entities for defrauding their customers or 
the market, as opposed to defrauding their shareholders. 
 154. At the time that it declared bankruptcy in 2001, Enron was the seventh largest 
company on the Fortune 500 list by revenues. See Matt Moore, Bankrupt Enron No. 5 
in Fortune 500 List, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Apr. 4, 2002, available at 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/enron/1327642.html. 
 155. Until the financial problems of WorldCom became acute in spring 2002, the 
bills under consideration in the Senate and House were not given much chance of 
passage. See Peter J. Wallison, Sarbanes-Oxley as an Inside-the-Beltway Phenomenon, 
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viewed previously as paragons of industry.  Congress reacted to the new 
spate of corporate scandals in the same way that it did in response to the 
insider trading scandals of the 1980s—it provided the SEC with 
significant authority to enforce new and existing laws.156  The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 imposed significant, additional requirements on 
corporations and their officers and directors.157  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
greatly expanded the Commission’s enforcement powers and the 
criminal penalties for violating the federal securities laws.158
Section 1105 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act permits the SEC to obtain 
officer and director bars in administrative proceedings, and section 
305(a) amended 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) and 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) by 
lowering the standard for obtaining a bar from “substantially unfit” to 
“unfit.”  Prior to the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, an officer and 
director bar was available only in civil injunctive actions after a showing 
that the officer or director was “substantially unfit” to serve in the 
position.159
Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contained a novel “Fair 
Funds” provision that allows the Commission to disperse the penalties 
obtained from wrongdoers to compensate harmed shareholders.160  
Section 308 had no counterpart in the Senate bill, because it was added 
AMERICAN ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, June 2004, at 2, available at 
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.20582/pub_detail.asp.  The collapse of 
WorldCom, relatively close to the 2002 congressional election, which both political 
parties acknowledged as a rematch of the very close presidential election of 2000, led to 
the eventual enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with only three votes against it in 
the entire Congress.  Some in Washington dubbed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act the “Bernie 
Ebbers Memorial Act” after the then-CEO of WorldCom. 
 156. In the intervening years following the Remedies Act, Congress did not adjust 
the SEC’s enforcement authority to any great extent.  The principal exception was the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 §104, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78t(e)).  The PSLRA amended the securities laws to 
allow the SEC to bring actions against secondary violators that aid and abet securities 
law violations.  Congress wisely declined to extend that right to private parties, out of 
concern over abusive securities litigation. 
 157. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 158. The changes relevant to this Article are discussed below.  The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act included other provisions that are not discussed here. 
 159. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1105, 15 U.S.C. 7246 (2006). 
 160. Id. § 308(a). 
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during the conference process.161  Accordingly, the Senate Banking 
Committee report does not discuss this provision. 
Prior to Section 308(a), the Commission was permitted to remit 
amounts obtained in actions as disgorgement to injured investors, but 
was required to remit any penalties it received to the U.S. Treasury.  
Section 308(a) provided flexibility to the Commission to distribute both 
disgorgement and penalties through a Fair Fund, but the penalties cannot 
be dispersed absent disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.162  Congress, 
joined by the Justice Department, wanted to avoid having penalties 
become a substitute for disgorgement.  Disgorgement is the forfeiture of 
the ill-gotten gains received by the defendant; it is not inherently a 
mechanism to recompense aggrieved investors.  By making 
disgorgement a prerequisite for adding penalties to the Fair Fund, 
Congress focused on depriving the defendant of its ill-gotten gains, not 
necessarily punishing wrongdoers.163  Congress also may have been 
concerned with a possible windfall to investors if the defendant did not 
receive any ill-gotten gain from the wrongdoing. 
Congress also required the SEC to study ways to improve the Fair 
Funds process.  Section 308(c) of Sarbanes-Oxley instructed the SEC to 
review and analyze enforcement actions over the course of the five years 
prior to enactment “to identify areas where such proceedings may be 
utilized to efficiently, effectively, and fairly provide restitution for 
injured investors . . . including methods to improve the collection rates 
 161. See Press Release, Baker Proposes New Federal Investor Restitution Fund (July 
17, 2002), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20031108035021/www.baker.hous 
e.gov/News/fair_fund.htm [hereinafter Baker I]. 
 162. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308(a).  Within the first six months of having the 
authority, the Commission sought federal court approval of Fair Fund distributions on at 
least 12 occasions. Stephen Cutler, Dir. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Testimony Concerning Returning Funds to Defrauded Investors Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters., Comm. on Fin. Servs. 10 
(Feb. 26, 2003) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/022603tssmc.htm 
[hereinafter Cutler Testimony]. 
 163. See Press Release, Baker Statement to Open House-Senate Conference on 
Corporate Reform (July 19, 2002), available at http://web.archive.org/web/2003090603 
5258/www.baker.house.gov/News/conf_corprfm.htm. 
How is it possible for anyone to sit idly by while watching a corporate official move 
into his $20 million mansion, with hundreds of millions of dollars in retirement 
benefits, having generated this lifestyle by manipulating the books and defrauding 
shareholders? With the adoption of the FAIR plan, we will make this much less likely 
to occur and offer the hope to investors for a small reduction in their loss. 
Id.; see also Baker I, supra note 161. 
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for civil penalties and disgorgements.”164  Section 308(c) instructed the 
SEC to provide a report to Congress within 180 days of the enactment of 
the Act that included “a discussion of regulatory or legislative actions” 
that the SEC recommended or “that may be necessary to address 
concerns identified in the study.”165
In response to Section 308(c), the Commission submitted a report to 
Congress on January 23, 2003.166  In its report, the Commission 
described the limitations of the requirement in Section 308(a) for the 
SEC to obtain disgorgement before adding the penalty amount to the 
Fair Fund: 
Currently, the Fair Fund provision permits the Commission to add 
penalty money to distribution funds in limited circumstances.  If a 
defendant is ordered only to pay a penalty, then that defendant’s 
penalty amount cannot be added to the disgorgement fund.  
Moreover, if no defendants in a case are ordered to pay 
disgorgement, then no penalties may be distributed to injured 
investors.  Some issuer financial fraud and reporting cases do not 
result in any disgorgement orders because no defendant received a 
tangible profit causally connected to the fraud.167
To alleviate these restrictions, the Commission recommended that 
Congress amend Section 308 to permit the penalties to be added to the 
Fair Funds even when no disgorgement is obtained.  The Commission’s 
report stated: 
By amending the Fair Fund provision to allow defendants’ penalties 
to be distributed to investors irrespective of whether the defendant 
has been ordered to disgorge money, Congress could allow more 
monies to be returned to harmed investors.168
 164. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308(c). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE 
SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308c 
report.pdf. 
 167. Id. at 34. 
 168. Id.; see also Cutler Testimony, supra note 162. 
[I]t would be beneficial if the Commission could distribute penalties collected from 
these defendants (as well as from defendants who are paying disgorgement) to harmed 
investors in that case . . . . We recommend making technical amendments to the Fair 
Fund provision to permit the Commission to use penalty moneys for distribution funds 
in these additional circumstances. 
Id. 
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In response to the Commission’s request, Chairman Richard Baker 
of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government-
Sponsored Enterprises of the House Financial Services Committee 
introduced legislation in 2003 and 2006 to permit any penalty monies 
obtaining by the Commission to be added to a Fair Fund for the benefit 
of victims of the securities law violation.169  Neither bill passed 
Congress.170
Proponents of corporate penalties argue that the Fair Funds 
provision of the Section 308 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act alleviates the 
earlier concerns raised by the Commission in 1989 and Congress in 
1990 about harm to shareholders, because any penalties collected are 
distributed to shareholders.  This argument is premised on flawed, 
circular reasoning.  When the Commission obtains penalties from a 
corporation, there is always one group of shareholders that must pay.  
The Commission is taking from one group of shareholders to 
recompense another.171  Whatever its characterization, ultimately the 
costs of making this circular distribution are borne by shareholders. 
There is no doubt that Section 308 was rooted in good intentions of 
attempting to help defrauded shareholders.  Unfortunately, it has 
injected an element of uncertainty because penalties are inherently 
subjective, while disgorgement is rooted in the notion of illicit gain, 
which generally is quantifiable.  In many instances, the SEC has 
avoided—some argue circumvented—the requirements of Section 308 
by assessing a “nominal” disgorgement amount of $1 in order to obtain 
the “hook” to justify seeking a large corporate penalty to put into a Fair 
Fund for distribution.172  As a result, the Fair Fund provision, which was 
 169. See Fair Fund Improvement Act, H.R. 5956, 109th Cong. (2006); Securities 
Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2004, H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2004); 
Dissenting Views to Accompany H.R. 2179, H.R. REP. No. 108-475 (Apr. 27, 2004); 
see also Press Release, Baker, Oxley Introduce Bill To Strengthen SEC Powers Against 
Securities Fraud, Return Funds To Defrauded Investors (May 21, 2003), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030602 
192406/www.baker.house.gov/News/fair_bill.htm. 
 170. The bills did not advance in Congress because of the general unwillingness to 
re-open the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
 171. The Fair Fund distribution thus creates a circular situation: the Commission 
penalizes a corporation to put the money into a fund to reimburse the shareholders who 
were themselves just indirectly penalized. 
 172. See, e.g., Bruce Carton, When a Dollar (of Disgorgement) Is Worth Millions, 
SEC. CLASS ACTION SERV., (Institutional S’holder Servs.), Dec. 3, 2004, available at 
http://scas.issproxy.com/Newsletter/issscasDecember2004.html#POVEditorial (discus-
2008 EVALUATING THE MISSION 399 
 
designed to protect shareholders, has been used as a justification for 
obtaining large corporate penalties, which may harm shareholders.  
Therein lies the paradox: Fair Funds used to compensate injured 
shareholders are often funded largely through corporate penalties, which 
are paid by the corporation’s current shareholders and result in 
additional adverse consequences for the company through depletion of 
its assets. 
AN ERA OF INCREASING PENALTIES AGAINST SHAREHOLDERS 
The size of the penalties imposed by the Commission has increased 
markedly in recent years.173  For example, in 2002, the SEC obtained its 
first $10 million penalty against a public corporation in its settlement 
with Xerox Corporation.174  Since then, the Commission has levied 
many civil penalties in that amount or larger.  In 2003, the Commission 
obtained twenty penalties in that range or greater, while in 2004, it 
sing recent settlements such as Symbol Technologies ($1 disgorgement; $37,000,000 
civil penalty), i2 Technologies ($1 disgorgement; $10,000,000 civil penalty), Royal 
Dutch Petroleum ($1 disgorgement; $120,000,000 civil penalty), Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co. ($1 disgorgement; $150,000,000 civil penalty),  and Qwest ($1 disgorgement; 
$250,000,000 civil penalty)).  Disgorgement is a remedy that, if available, is supposed 
to be exhausted before the SEC seeks a penalty.  Therefore, only in the rarest of 
circumstances should the SEC seek a penalty that accomplishes the goal of stripping 
away an ill-gotten benefit.  Unfortunately, that has not been the case in many SEC 
penalty actions.  Many of those actions have blurred the distinction between “benefit” 
and “restitution.” 
 173. Not only have civil monetary penalties increased, the number of officer and 
director bars has also increased drastically over the last several years as has the 
involvement of criminal authorities, such as the Department of Justice, in securities law 
violations.  In 2004, 170 director and officer bars were entered—more than three times 
as many as entered in 2001—and the DOJ brought criminal proceedings against 302 
entities and individuals in SEC related matters. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT 
ON THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION 25 (2006), available at http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/eodmud 
jqljq2lvttjhn56rn4uubva3yoyzeijj2sh4ugkxlo6xyrpu3cqismvuckpgea3o4gpn4utyo7uzs7
ueqydmc/0603SECEnforcementStudy.pdf. 
 174. Xerox Corp., Litigation Release No. 17465, 77 SEC Docket 971, 2002 WL 
535379 (Apr. 11, 2002); see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2004 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE 
PLAN AND 2002 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/gpra2004_2002.pdf. 
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obtained forty such penalties.175  The total amount of issuer penalties in 
2003 and 2004 was greater than the total amount of all penalties 
imposed by the SEC for the prior fifteen years combined.  From 2003 
through 2007, approximately $13.8 billion in disgorgement and civil 
penalties were ordered to be paid to the SEC, courts, or other appointed 
trustees.176
An essential consideration in deciding the appropriateness of any 
corporate penalty is determining who has profited from the illegal 
conduct.  Sometimes, shareholders have benefited, as in cases of price 
fixing or bribery of foreign officials; without the bribe, the corporation 
would not have received a benefit.  Regulated entities, such as broker-
dealers or registered investment advisors, might increase profits or 
revenues, which in turn benefit shareholders, by failing to comply with 
regulatory requirements.177  In the rare instances where disgorgement 
may be difficult to calculate, corporate penalties may be appropriate to 
reverse the ill-gotten benefit. 
On the other hand, there are situations where the shareholders did 
not benefit from the securities law violation.  In a typical financial fraud 
case, management misrepresented the corporation’s financial 
performance to the owners of the corporation.  In the typical case, the 
shareholders have suffered from management’s deception and received 
no ill-gotten gain.  When the fraud becomes public, often the market 
reacts by depressing the value of the stock.  In addition, an investigation 
and ensuing litigation distracts management from the business, drains 
corporate resources, and harms the corporation’s reputation.  A penalty 
would add further to shareholder injury. 
In the majority of SEC corporate penalty cases, the corporation has 
also been sued for the same transgressions in civil class action suits 
seeking restitution for allegedly harmed shareholders.  Settlement 
proceeds from such private actions should be recognized by the 
Commission as an offset when determining whether to penalize a 
corporation in a financial fraud case.  Indeed, by statute, the 
Commission must consider such restitution in its own administrative 
proceedings when a penalty is under consideration. 
 175. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2004 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT (2005), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar04.pdf; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2003 (2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/ 
ar03full.pdf. 
 176. 2007 REPORT, supra note 9, at 26. 
 177. Penalty figures in this Article do not include regulated entities. 
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Another essential consideration in seeking and imposing a penalty 
is the effectiveness of the sanction.  There is an inherent conflict of 
interest between management and shareholders of a corporation.  If 
senior managers are faced with the threat of enforcement actions against 
them or their former colleagues, the senior managers might be motivated 
by their self-interest to settle the action against the corporation for a 
large corporate penalty.  The penalty obtained in settlement with the 
corporation may satisfy the SEC’s desire to garner public awareness 
(and thus enhance the “deterrent” effect), causing the SEC to forgo 
seeking large penalties against individual managers.  This willingness to 
forgo seeking penalties against individuals increases when the evidence 
against the individuals is relatively weak (indicating a greater risk of 
losing at trial), or when the individuals have negligible assets or name 
recognition (diminished publicity and deterrence value). 
Other potential conflicts of interest exist between management and 
shareholders that may interfere with the effectiveness of the sanction.  
New senior managers, who may have started after the departure of 
former employees tainted by the fraud, may feel compelled to settle the 
matter to minimize negative publicity from their being associated with 
the fraud.  In addition, corporate boards, while exercising business 
judgment, may approve a settlement to avoid the costs and other 
negative effects of prolonged litigation with the SEC. 
As both a philosophical and practical matter, the effectiveness of a 
corporate penalty as a means for deterrence is questionable.  
Corporations do not act; individuals do.  Senior managers who commit 
fraud undoubtedly do so with the knowledge that their actions, if 
exposed, will cause reputational and economic harm to their corporation, 
such as a depressed stock price, loss of customers and business partners, 
shareholder litigation, and legal and investigative costs.  Often, what 
motivates the wrongdoer to commit the fraud is the potential personal 
pecuniary gain of increased stock price, personal advancement within 
the corporation, or masking the negative effects of strategic or tactical 
management decisions on the performance of the company.  If 
wrongdoers have little concern for their company and shareholders when 
they commit the fraud, it is doubtful that the behavior of potential 
wrongdoers will be altered by the threat of a corporate penalty on the 
company and shareholders that they are seeking to victimize.  Are 
would-be fraudsters more likely to be deterred by headlines trumpeting a 
multimillion dollar corporate fine, or by hearing that a senior executive 
was fired, lost his savings, became barred from serving as an officer or a 
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director, suffered irreparable harm to his reputation, and perhaps faces 
incarceration? 
Each of these considerations continues to be important when the 
Commission evaluates whether to seek a penalty against a corporation.  
In providing the SEC with the power to seek penalties against 
corporations, Congress recognized the need for the SEC to have the 
authority in limited and rare circumstances, and it trusted the SEC with 
the discretion to use that authority in accordance with the SEC’s mission 
of protecting investors.  In order to provide some transparency to the 
process, the Commission has issued guidance to the public concerning 
what factors the Commission considers and what prospective defendants 
may do to avoid a penalty or reduce the amount. 
 
THE 2006 STATEMENT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
CONCERNING FINANCIAL PENALTIES 
Under a new chairman, the Commission on January 4, 2006, 
released a statement concerning the factors that the SEC would evaluate 
in assessing a monetary penalty.178  In formulating the penalty statement, 
the Commission returned to first principles: it discussed the 1989 and 
1990 Commission and Congressional statements regarding penalties and 
attempted to set up a hierarchy of balancing considerations to guide 
future deliberations.  It stated unequivocally that penalties against 
corporations can harm shareholders, a point that previously had been in 
dispute within the Commission. 
The Commission explained that the two most significant factors 
are: (1) the presence or absence of a direct benefit to the corporation as a 
result of the violation, and (2) the degree to which the penalty will 
recompense or further harm shareholders.179  The first key factor 
focused on unjust enrichment to the corporation, and thus to the 
shareholders.  Any improper benefit would have to be balanced against 
the losses incurred by the shareholders as a result of the fraud. 
The second key factor balances the possibility that the penalty will 
“recompense” investors with the injury that the penalty would do to 
them.  In this factor, the Commission, unfortunately, was rather 
 178. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm [hereinafter 2006 Penalty Statement]. 
 179. Id. 
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imprecise with its terms.  In every case, current stockholders pay for the 
penalty.  The purpose of this language was to cover the cases in which 
other classes of investors may have been harmed for the benefit of the 
stockholders—for example, fraudulently enhanced financial statements 
may have resulted in lower coupon interest rates or yields to 
bondholders, to the benefit of the corporation and its common 
stockholders. 
The Commission also announced secondary factors for 
consideration.  Those factors are: (1)  “The need to deter the particular 
type of offense;” (2)  “The extent of the injury to innocent parties;” (3) 
“Whether complicity in the violation is widespread throughout the 
corporation;” (4) “The level of intent on the part of the perpetrators;” (5) 
“The degree of difficulty in detecting the particular type of offense;” (6) 
“Presence or lack of remedial steps by the corporation;” and (7) “Extent 
of cooperation with Commission and other law enforcement.”180
The penalty statement has served as a reminder of the fact that 
corporate penalties harm shareholders.  Nevertheless, it has had some 
unintended consequences.  In particular, the last factor—the extent of 
cooperation with the Commission and law enforcement—has been used 
along with other Commission guidance as a means to credit prospective 
defendants, particularly corporations, for waiving their attorney-client 
privilege and work-product protections.181
THE SEABOARD REPORT 
The SEC’s explicit willingness to credit cooperation, even if it 
involves the waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work-product 
protection, predates the 2006 Statement on Penalties and the Sarbanes-
 180. Id. 
 181. The New York Stock Exchange lists waiver of the attorney-client privilege as a 
factor in evaluating whether a Member has exhibited “extraordinary cooperation.” See 
New York Stock Exchange, Information Memorandum No. 05-65 to All Members, 
Member Organizations and Chief Operating Officers 5 (Sept. 14, 2005).  Members of 
the New York Stock Exchange are required as a condition for listing to cooperate and 
produce documents upon request by the Exchange, but that required cooperation does 
not include a mandatory requirement to produce attorney-client privileged information.  
FINRA (formerly NASD) Rule 8210 requires members and persons associated with 
members to produce non-privileged documents and provide testimony upon request by 
FINRA. See FINRA Rule 8210, available at http://finra.complinet.com.  As a general 
matter, the SEC does not impose any similar mandatory requirements to cooperate in its 
investigations. 
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Oxley Act.  On October 23, 2001, the Commission released an 
investigative report pursuant to section 21(a) of the Exchange Act, 
addressing the relationship of cooperation and agency enforcement 
decisions.182  That report, called the “Seaboard Report” based on the 
name of the defendant at issue, marked the first time that the 
Commission announced the factors that it would evaluate in measuring 
cooperation and assessing whether to bring an enforcement action. 
The Commission intended this report to encourage companies to 
cooperate with the SEC in investigations.  In that respect, the report was 
a major improvement in the transparency of the SEC in its enforcement 
investigations.  Lacking a public manual of policies and procedures, the 
SEC in effect encouraged an informal body of knowledge to develop 
among long-time SEC enforcement practitioners as to what was 
expected of potential defendants in dealing with the Commission.183  
The Seaboard report was a long-overdue attempt to open up the process. 
Among other issues, the Seaboard Report discussed disclosures to 
staff of confidential information protected by the attorney-client 
privilege or work-product doctrine.  In a footnote, the Seaboard Report 
stated: 
The Commission recognizes that these privileges, protections and 
exemptions serve important social interests.  In this regard, the 
Commission does not view a company’s waiver of a privilege as an 
end in itself, but only as a means (where necessary) to provide 
relevant and sometimes critical information to the Commission 
staff.184
Waiver is not itself listed as one of the Seaboard criteria for 
determining whether, and how much, to credit self-policing, self-
reporting, remediation, and cooperation. Nonetheless, the Enforcement 
Division and the Commission in the ensuing years often have 
misinterpreted the Seaboard Report as a basis for rewarding companies 
for waiving privilege.  As a practical matter, rewarding companies for 
 182. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency 
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm#P54_10935. 
183.     The Wells Committee had the same concern with inexperienced practitioners 
being unaware of a prospective defendant’s ability to provide written submissions that 
raised factual and legal defenses. See supra, text accompanying note 58. 
 184. Id. at n.3. 
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cooperating by waiving privilege has the same effect as punishing them 
for not waiving privilege—both effectively strip the attorney-client 
privilege, which is a fundamental component of our legal system.185
Another problem with a permissive approach to waiver is that 
waiver becomes mandatory in practice.  Faced with concerns over their 
fiduciary duties and the expense and risk of litigation to the corporation, 
a corporation’s board of directors may feel compelled to take full 
advantage of any cooperation credit available to it by waiving the 
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection.  Indeed, 
shareholders likely would be unable to establish that the board of 
directors breached its fiduciary duty by waiving the corporation’s 
privilege in exchange for cooperation credit if the corporation faced the 
threat of a large penalty.186
 185. See, e.g., The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in 
Corporate Investigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (2006) 
(statement of Edwin Meese III, former Att’y Gen. of the United States and Chairman, 
Ctr. for Legal and Judicial Studies, Heritage Foundation), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2054&wit_id=5741.   
[E]xperience has shown that the [Thompson] Memorandum has resulted in the 
dilution of essential rights encompassed by the attorney-client relationship. . . . [T]he 
Thompson Memorandum itself pressures companies to fulfill its nine factors, 
including by waiving their attorney-client privilege and cutting off their employees’ 
attorney fees.  Even if no prosecutor ever mentions either factor to a company, the 
fact that the Thompson Memorandum requires federal prosecutors to take all nine of 
its factors into consideration when deciding whether to indict a business organization 
necessarily places great pressure on the company to take these two steps.   
Id.  For a discussion of the Thompson Memorandum and other Justice Department 
memoranda regarding waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product protection, 
see infra note 187. 
 186. Just as with any individual, corporations must not obstruct government 
investigations and must comply with duly issued subpoenas and court orders.  
Individuals and corporations, however, owe no duty to abandon all potential defenses 
and privileges in the face of government investigations.  In fact, under state law, the 
directors of a corporation owe fiduciary duties to their shareholders. See, e.g., Smith v. 
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (discussing the duties of directors).  Under 
most state laws, including Delaware General Corporate Law, the board of directors of a 
corporation owes to its shareholders a duty of care and loyalty. See id.  In some 
instances, cooperating with the SEC or another regulator may be contrary to the 
fiduciary duties of the directors because cooperation may lead to the corporation’s 
being susceptible to meritless governmental actions and frivolous shareholder litigation.  
In those circumstances, it may be appropriate for the board of directors, in fully 
evaluating the situation and exercising business judgment, to decline to waive their 
attorney-client privilege with respect to a government investigation.  
406 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
The idea of crediting the waiving of the attorney-client privilege or 
work-product protection originated with the Department of Justice.  Two 
years prior to the Seaboard Report, the DOJ published the first 
memorandum—of what would ultimately be several memoranda—
illuminating on the meaning of cooperation and the general principles 
that the Department of Justice follows when investigating business 
organizations.187  These DOJ memoranda stated explicitly that a 
corporation’s willingness to waive the attorney-client privilege and 
work-product protection should be considered in determining whether a 
corporation has cooperated adequately with the government.  Given the 
number of parallel investigations by the DOJ and SEC, the policies of 
one agency affect the conduct of the other’s investigations and limit the 
possible range of choices available to a defendant.188
  187.     The first memorandum was sent by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder to all 
Department Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys on June 16, 1999 (the “Holder 
Memorandum”).  The Holder Memorandum focused on the prosecution of corporate 
criminal activity and included a document called “Federal Prosecution of 
Corporations,” which outlined factors and considerations to be taken into account when 
charging corporations. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of 
Department Components and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999) (on file with the 
Department of Justice).  The second memorandum, which was a response to the 
substantial controversy that arose over the Holder Memorandum, was sent by Deputy 
Attorney General Larry Thompson in January 2003 and included much of the same text 
from the Holder memo, with some changes to reflect findings of the Corporate Fraud 
Task Force. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of 
Department Components and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm.  Mounting criticism regarding 
lack of policies and procedures in this regard led acting Deputy Attorney General 
Robert McCallum in 2005 to amend the U.S. Attorney’s manual to require that U.S. 
Attorneys establish a written waiver review process for their respective districts. See 
Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of 
Department Components and United States Attorneys (Oct. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00163.htm.  
Finally, the Justice Department, under the direction of Deputy Attorney General Paul J. 
McNulty, released a memorandum that attempted to draw distinctions on categories of 
privileged material. See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, 
to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), 
available at .  The 
McNulty memorandum still gives entities credit for turning over attorney-client 
privileged material and attorney work product.   
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf
 188. The implications extend to individuals as well.  DOJ allows prosecutors to 
consider a company’s willingness to punish employees who assert their constitutional 
rights and whether the company entered into joint-defense or information-sharing 
agreements with employees.  This policy could cause an employee to face the difficult 
choice of losing his job or cooperating in an internal investigation without counsel and 
without constitutional protections. See, e.g., Proposed Amendment of Commentary on 
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The practices of the SEC and DOJ to credit cooperation for waiving 
the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection have met with 
significant criticism.  On February 5, 2007, the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) submitted to the SEC a proposed “Revised 
Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency 
Enforcement Decisions,” which seeks to have the SEC revise the 
Seaboard Report with respect to the waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege and work-product protection.189  The proposal amends the 
section of the Seaboard Report describing the factors by which 
cooperation may be measured to read: “provided, however, that a 
company shall not be required to take any of the foregoing actions to the 
extent that it would result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or 
work product doctrine.”190  The proposal also seeks to remove the 
ambiguous footnote 3 of the Seaboard Report that describes waiver as “a 
means (where necessary) to provide relevant and sometimes critical 
information to the Commission staff.”  The proposal adds a new 
paragraph and related footnote describing the importance of attorney-
client privilege and work-product protection and the adverse 
consequences when staff seeks the waiver.191  The new paragraph states 
in part: 
Commission staff shall not take any action or assert any position that 
directly or indirectly demands, requests or encourages a company or 
its attorneys to waive its attorney-client privilege or the protections 
of the work product doctrine.  Also, in assessing a company’s 
cooperation, Commission staff shall not draw any inference from the 
company’s preservation of its attorney-client privilege and the 
protections of the work product doctrine.  At the same time, the 
voluntary decision by a company to waive the attorney-client 
Section 8c2.5 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Regarding Waiver of Attorney-
Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine Before the United States Sentencing 
Commission (2006) (statement of Kent Wicker, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers). 
This compelled waiver of the attorney-client privilege forced my client to give up the 
protection at the heart of our criminal justice system: The privilege under the Fifth 
Amendment against self-incrimination. It is not enough to say he could have just 
given up his job and retained his Fifth Amendment rights. This is a real person, with a 
real family to support. 
Id. 
 189. Letter from Karen J. Mathis, President, American Bar Ass’n, to Christopher 
Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 5, 2007), available at http://www.aba 
net.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/2007feb05_privwaivsec_l.pdf. 
 190. Id. at 2. 
 191. Id. at 2-3. 
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privilege and/or the work product doctrine shall not be considered 
when assessing whether the company provided effective cooperation.  
The Commission may consider, however, in assessing whether a 
company has provided effective cooperation, the degree to which the 
company has provided factual information to the Commission staff 
in a manner, to be worked out by the company and the Commission 
staff, that preserves the protections of the attorney-client privilege 
and work product doctrine to the extent possible.192
Similar criticisms by other groups have been, and continue to be, 
levied against using the Seaboard Report to encourage waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege or work-product protection.193
As the SEC and other Federal agencies press to have the attorney-
client privilege waived as they undertake investigations, the entire 
privilege is gradually weakened.  As knowledge of its weakening 
spreads, corporate employees may become less candid and forthcoming, 
corporate internal investigations will be less trustworthy, and 
shareholders and government investigators will be frustrated in their 
efforts to prevent misdeeds.  Given those outcomes, revisiting Seaboard 
and the SEC’s approach to the attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection is long overdue. 
A CALL FOR A NEW ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
The SEC Enforcement Division is viewed with pride by 
Commissioners, staff, alumni, and many outsiders.  The Division has a 
long history of stellar achievements and dedicated attorneys, 
accountants, and other staff.  Thirty-six years after its creation, the 
Division is larger, stronger, and more visible than any member of the 
Wells Committee could have imagined.  Thus, it makes sense that the 
 192. Id. at 3.  The proposal recognizes that there are limited, specific exceptions 
where the staff, after obtaining advance approval from the Director of Enforcement or 
his/her designee, may seek privileged or work-product materials.  Those exceptions 
arise when the company asserts the advice of counsel defense or the SEC staff 
establishes the elements for the crime/fraud exception. Id. 
 193. See, e.g., McLucas, Shapiro & Song, The Decline of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (2006); Posting 
of Thomas O. Gorman, The Rolling Stones Test: SEC And DOJ Cooperation Standards, 
SEC Actions Blog, http://www.secactions.com/?p=190 (May 22, 2007, 01:07 EST) 
(“Conversely no cooperation credit should be given for what the government says it 
does not usually need –privileged material and waivers.”). 
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Commission should consider whether it is time to convene a Wells-like 
committee to “bring to date” the best thinking on enforcement practices. 
The new advisory committee’s mission would be to conduct an 
independent review of the Commission’s enforcement program from 
multiple, diverse perspectives, and to recommend to the Commission, if 
warranted, any needed changes.  We propose that the new advisory 
committee adopt the same mandate as that of the Wells Committee in 
1972.  The tasks assigned to the Wells Committee are as important today 
as they were in 1972.  If the same mandate is adopted, the new advisory 
committee would be charged with virtually the same tasks as the original 
Wells Committee, only slightly adapted to developments in the last three 
decades: 
(1) reviewing and evaluating the Commission’s 
enforcement policies and practices in light of its 
statutory responsibilities and mission to protect 
investors; to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; 
and to facilitate capital formation; 
(2) advising how the SEC’s enforcement objectives and 
strategies may be made more effective; 
(3) examining the Commission’s enforcement practices 
and procedures from the point of view of due process,194 
respect for the prospective defendants’ attorney-client 
privilege and work-product protection,195 the relationship 
of enforcement action to notice of legal requirements, 
the attribution of responsibility for violations, and the 
 194. The Committee should consider the Commission’s current procedure regarding 
authorization of cases implicating potential corporate penalties, under which the 
Commission authorizes the staff to negotiate a settlement, before the staff engages in 
any settlement discussions with the prospective defendant.  At issue is whether the 
Commission, at the time of authorization of negotiations, should also authorize the staff 
to litigate if the settlement negotiations prove unfruitful, or whether the staff should 
return to the Commission to seek litigation authorization.  The issues hearken back to 
those that animated the debate around the original Wells Committee Recommendation 
20, namely whether authorizing staff to litigate before commencing settlement 
negotiations skews the negotiations through the implicit threat to litigate if no 
settlement is reached. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text. 
 195. Included in this task would be the need to re-evaluate the 2006 Statement 
Regarding Penalties and the 2001 Seaboard Report, particularly with respect to the 
expectation of waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product protection as a 
determinant of cooperation. 
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protection of reputation and rights of privacy of those 
with whom the Commission interacts;196
(4) making recommendations on the appropriate blend of 
regulation, publicity, and formal enforcement action and 
on methods of furthering voluntary compliance with 
securities laws; 
(5) making recommendations on criteria for the selection 
and disposition of enforcement actions, in particular, 
providing timely notice to parties of the closing of an 
investigation; and 
(6) advising on the appropriate uses of penalties against 
corporations in light of the SEC’s mission of protecting 
investors.   
 
Among the many issues that would fall under this broad mandate 
would be the implementation of mechanisms to provide more efficacy, 
predictability and transparency to the enforcement program.  The overall 
philosophy and management of the enforcement program should be 
examined to determine how best it can fulfill the SEC’s mission, in light 
of resources and statutory authority.   
 Predictability and transparency provide for a fair process that 
respects the rights of all parties involved and ensures adherence to the 
rule of law.197  Of course, the Commission’s discretion should not be 
eliminated in favor of rote application of a mathematical formula for 
calculating penalties.  Discretion plays an important role in forgoing 
certain theories of liability or not bringing an action at all.  For example, 
a company and its shareholders may have been punished enough through 
 196. Beyond the scope of this Article is the ancillary issue of disclosure by issuers of 
the various stages of an SEC investigation.  Although in large part a facts-and-
circumstances determination as to materiality, guidance would be helpful to issuers and 
practitioners. 
 197. With the increasing emphasis on a more punitive enforcement approach, are 
sufficient safeguards in place to protect the rights of prospective individual defendants?  
At the time of the Wells Committee, the SEC lacked the power to seek punitive 
damages against individuals, so the potential costs to the individual defendant were not 
as pronounced as they are today.  Individual defendants are faced with high costs of 
defending an SEC action and severe consequences if they lose.  These consequences at 
times can be tantamount to criminal sanctions, including large monetary payments and 
loss of livelihood.  Often, the only option is a pro-se defense.  Will a Commission one 
day decide that it should establish a system to provide representation to individual 
defendants who cannot afford to hire private counsel? 
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other avenues or the securities law violation may have been merely an 
honest mistake.  Indeed, the Wells Committee’s Recommendation 14 
discussed this type of discretion: 
The Commission should give due consideration in cases which 
appear to involve honest mistake or good faith efforts at compliance 
to exercising its discretion against bringing a formal enforcement 
proceeding notwithstanding the appearance of a violation.198
The ability of the Enforcement Division to recommend to the 
Commission that no action be taken in a particular matter should be 
encouraged and institutionalized.  This will require, among other things, 
a re-evaluation of the incentives for bringing actions and obtaining large 
penalties (such as through promotions, awards, and public recognition).  
Statistics, such as the number of cases brought and the penalties 
recovered, should play only a minimal role in assessing individual 
performance.  Instead, an evaluation system should focus on rewarding 
high quality efforts and professionalism regardless of the outcome of 
particular actions.  A decision to forgo bringing an enforcement action 
should not be treated automatically as a loss, but it should be evaluated 
qualitatively alongside other enforcement decisions.     
In some instances, exercising discretion may not be appropriate.  
There should not be institutional encouragement for using discretion to 
formulate theories of liability that overstep the boundaries of existing 
law.  Law making is reserved for legislative process in Congress and the 
SEC rulemaking process under the strict requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act; it is not a function of the Enforcement 
Division. 
Another aspect that could be considered by the advisory committee 
is the implementation of a written and uniform “full-disclosure” policy 
for enforcement matters.199  In criminal procedure, this is often referred 
to as an “open jacket” policy.  Operating under such a policy, the 
enforcement staff would show defense counsel the evidence it has 
against the prospective defendant, which is the essence of due process.  
Some practicing lawyers have criticized the SEC Enforcement Division 
for failing to explain to defendants the allegations of wrongdoing and 
failing to share critical incriminating—and most importantly, 
 198. WELLS COMMITTEE ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 39, at iv. 
199.     The Wells Committee proposed the institutionalization of a similar policy. See 
supra note 71 and accompanying text.  Currently, there is not a uniform practice among 
the various units in the Enforcement Division.
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exculpatory—evidence that the SEC has gathered.200  Because no such 
policy is in place today, arguments in Wells Submissions often are based 
on defense counsel’s best guess as to the conduct that enforcement staff 
has identified as violating federal securities laws.  The sharing of 
information would promote the goal of fact-finding, which is paramount 
to due process and to the administration of justice. 
With the advent of additional remedies in the SEC’s arsenal in the 
decades after the Wells Committee and a shift in approach towards a 
more punitive focus, the idea of a full-disclosure policy is even more 
important than it was when the Wells Committee made its 
recommendations.  The SEC staff should inform fully individuals and 
companies about the allegations and the evidence at the time of a Wells 
call or, at the very latest, before entering into settlement discussions.  
Corporate boards, in particular, must be sufficiently informed so that 
they can apprise their shareholders and exercise good business judgment 
in determining whether to settle a matter with the SEC. 
Another aspect of the enforcement program that the new advisory 
committee should consider is the process for closing investigations.  In a 
report to Congress by the General Accountability Office (“GAO”), the 
GAO harshly criticized the Enforcement Division for not closing 
investigations promptly and observed that the Division had a 
“potentially large backlog of investigations that are not likely to result in 
enforcement actions and for which closing packages have not been 
completed.”201  As a result, the GAO concluded that “the subjects of 
many aged and inactive investigations may continue to suffer adverse 
consequences until closing actions are completed.”202
Enforcement Division officials told the GAO that their attorneys 
may believe that pursuing potential securities violations is a higher 
 200. See, e.g., Kevin J. Harnishch & Natasha Colton, When the SEC Comes 
Knocking, 15 A.B.A. SEC. BUS. L. 1 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/ 
blt/2005-09-10/colton.shtml. 
 201. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-830, SEC: ADDITIONAL 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS ADDRESS LIMITATIONS IN 
ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OPERATIONS 22 (2007), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07830.pdf.  For example, according to the GAO 
Report, one SEC regional office reported that as of March 2007 about 35% of its open 
investigations were “more than 2 years old, had not resulted in an enforcement action, 
and were no longer being actively pursued.” Id. at 21.  In response, the Enforcement 
Division has undertaken to review the backlog and streamline the closing process. Id. at 
46. 
 202. Id. 
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priority than closing investigations.203  Officials also cited a scarcity of 
time, administrative support, and incentives to comply with established 
procedures for closing investigations.204  Although the GAO recognized 
that resolving the potentially large backlog of investigations would 
impose resource challenges for Enforcement Division,205 the GAO 
recommended that the SEC chairman direct the Enforcement Division to 
“consider developing expedited procedures for closing 
investigations.”206
When the Commission or its staff determines that an investigation 
should be closed or action is not warranted, the agency promptly should 
send a closing letter.207  Closing letters should be sent not only to those 
who have made a Wells Submission, but also to any significant non-
party that has provided documents, information, or testimony to the 
SEC.  Similarly, if the enforcement staff views a person only as a 
witness or source of information in an investigation, staff should make 
that clear to the person. 
In its proposed mandate to examine enforcement practices and 
procedures from the point of view of due process, the new advisory 
committee should consider ways to improve the cherished Wells 
process.  One way in which the Wells process should be bolstered is 
through a mechanism to allow a proposed defendant to appear before the 
Commission to oppose a proposed enforcement proceeding.  Although it 
would likely be both unnecessary and unmanageable to allow such an 
“oral Wells submission” in every situation, it may be beneficial to both 
the Commission and proposed defendants for the Commission to have a 
discretionary avenue to hear from proposed defendants prior to taking 
action.  Matters that might be appropriate for this procedure would 
include complex factual cases, such as those necessitating expert 
witnesses, disputes concerning the level of cooperation, or cases in 
which character assessment and credibility is particularly important.208
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 7. 
207. The Wells Committee in Recommendation 8 proposed that the “Commission 
adopt in the usual case the practice of notifying an investigatee against whom no further 
action is contemplated that the staff has concluded its investigation . . . .” and will not 
recommend an enforcement action. WELLS COMMITTEE ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 
39, at 20. 
208.  For example, at both the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal 
Communications Commission, in-person presentations to commissioners and staff of 
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A review of the enforcement process would not be complete 
without a review of the costs to parties responding to an investigation.  
Responding to an SEC investigation is costly, particularly in the age of 
e-mails and electronic data.  The SEC must ensure that its investigations 
and enforcement actions do not impose unnecessary costs.  Overly broad 
subpoenas or document or interview requests add to a responding 
entity’s costs, and not every responding entity becomes a defendant.  
Innocent parties pay the price of overly broad requests.  Notices to 
preserve—and subsequent requests to produce—electronic data, 
including e-mails, voicemails, and server back-up tapes are particularly 
burdensome and costly to a company.  While it is undoubtedly critical 
for the SEC to have certain electronic data to conduct an investigation 
and litigate a matter, preservation notices and requests for production are 
often generic and extend well beyond the boundaries of the existing 
investigation.  It is difficult to justify imposing unnecessary costs on a 
company, particularly when the investigation may last many years and 
result in no action taken. 
The new advisory committee should recommend ways to minimize 
costs through the formulation of detailed procedures to address 
preservation notices and production requests for electronic data.  In 
recommending the procedures, the advisory committee should take into 
account the burden and expense of preserving certain kinds of records, 
such as electronic voicemail, and producing data stored in long-term 
media such as back-up tapes.  Preservation notices should be reasonably 
related to the matters under investigation, and prospective preservation 
of information should be invoked only if misconduct is suspected or 
ongoing.209  The use of generic preservation notices, covering data that 
the company might not otherwise preserve in the normal course of its 
operations, should be prohibited. 
Production requests should be narrowly tailored and should first 
seek information that is readily accessible.  Requests should not demand 
the production of data stored on back-up tapes unless unavailable 
through other sources.  As a measure to guard against overbroad 
requests, the advisory committee should consider ways to incorporate in 
enforcement procedures pre-approval of document requests by a senior 
member of the Enforcement Division. 
evidence and advocacy positions in advance of potential enforcement actions are 
routine.   
 209. Subjects of investigation already have other legal obligations to preserve 
documents. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006). 
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The advisory committee also should explore the establishment of an 
ombudsman to review and evaluate complaints about the enforcement 
process and behavior of the Enforcement staff.  An ombudsman would 
provide an avenue for persons to convey their grievances to the 
Commission without fear of reprisal.  People should be able to make 
these complaints anonymously through a hotline.210
The new advisory committee should examine the usage, effects, 
amount, and appropriateness of issuer penalties in financial fraud cases.  
The committee should consider whether these issuer penalties are 
consistent with the SEC’s mission of investor protection; maintaining 
fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitating capital formation.   
For example, do penalties protect investors?  Do they harm or benefit 
shareholders?  Is the circularity of Fair Fund penalty distributions 
consistent with ensuring fair, orderly, and efficient capital markets?  Is 
capital formation impeded by the threat of large, unpredictable issuer 
penalties?   
The advisory committee also should evaluate the moral hazards 
associated with issuer penalties.  One moral hazard is the possibility that 
managers of companies might agree to a large corporate penalty in order 
to avoid or soften actions against culpable individuals.211  Are 
individuals deterred from wrongdoing if they expect that shareholders 
will pay the penalties for the misconduct?   
The SEC also faces it own moral hazards when contemplating the 
assessment of issuer penalties.  Does the prospect of large issuer 
penalties and the inevitable press coverage cause the SEC to misallocate 
 210. The SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations already has 
such a hotline. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Office of Compliance Inspections & 
Examinations, Examination Hotline, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/ocie_hotlin 
e.shtml (last visited May 9, 2008). 
211.     See generally Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives 
“Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and 
the Debate over Entity versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 
(2007).  As Professor Langevoort explains: 
The corporate sanction avoids the need to attribute fault to any particular individual 
under circumstances where there is likely mutual finger pointing about who is to 
blame.  For all these reasons, company sanctions are the path of least resistance; the 
SEC can claim its victory and move its resources to new matters that deserve 
attention.  There is probably a publicity-related reason as well: sanctions against 
companies can be large enough to grab headlines, which is less likely to occur with 
respect to individual sanctions, even in the aggregate. 
Id. at 654. 
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resources to build these cases to the detriment of other types of 
enforcement actions?  
The Commission’s 2006 penalty statement was a significant first 
step in setting forth a principled foundation for examination of many of 
these concerns.212  In applying the penalty statement, the Commission 
has encountered areas not addressed by the statement, such as the 
determination of the amount of penalty and the appropriateness of 
imposing penalties on new shareholders.213  Taking the Commission’s 
experience into consideration, the new advisory committee should re-
examine these issues with the input of economists, legal scholars, and 
practitioners. 
These and any additional recommendations from the advisory 
committee that ultimately are approved by the Commission should be set 
forth in a publicly available Enforcement Manual.  In 2007, the minority 
members of the Senate Finance Committee recommended that the SEC 
create such a manual, which would be similar to the U.S. Attorney 
Manual, “to address situations or issues likely to recur.”214  The public 
accessibility of the manual would ensure transparency and uniform 
application.  The manual itself, and any later changes to it, should be 
reviewed and approved by the Commission.  Deviations from the 
manual, while necessary in some instances, should be discouraged.  The 
manual will serve as the governing guidelines for the Enforcement staff 
at headquarters and in the regional offices.  An Enforcement Manual that 
reflects the recommendations of an advisory committee, as adopted by 
the Commission, could serve as a useful framework for the 
Commission’s enforcement program in the years to come. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The SEC’s enforcement program serves a critical function in 
ensuring proper compliance with the U.S. securities laws.  Throughout 
212.     See 2006 Penalty Statement, supra note 178. 
213.   Many of these same concerns were raised by the Commission during the 
legislative debate over the Remedies Act of 1990. See, e.g., SEC Memorandum in 
Support of Remedies Act, supra note 96. 
 214. See Staff of S. Fin. Comm., 110th Cong., Report on the Firing of an SEC 
Attorney and the Investigation of Pequot Capital Management 7 (Comm. Print 2007), 
available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202007/Leg%20110%200803 
07%20SEC.pdf. 
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its history, the SEC has protected investors and the general public from a 
wide array of fraudulent conduct.  Given the importance of enforcement 
to the SEC’s mission, a critical review of the enforcement program—
similar to that done by the Wells Committee in 1972—is long overdue.  
This article is intended to start a list of items for consideration, but does 
not purport to identify all the areas that should be evaluated by a new 
Wells-like advisory committee.  The members of the advisory 
committee undoubtedly will draw from their own experiences and 
expertise to develop a full agenda.  The Commission should be receptive 
to considering any new ideas for improving the enforcement program 
and furthering the SEC’s mission.  We are confident that the result will 
be an enforcement program that is more transparent, better embodies 
principles of due process, and more effectively combats violations of the 
federal securities laws.
